25 CFR 515.13
§ 515.13 Specific exemptions.
United States · 25 CFR — Indians · Status: effective
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- Citation
- 25 CFR 515.13, § 515.13 Specific exemptions, United States, version 1 as recorded 2026-07-09, yourstate.us, https://yourstate.us/provision/107369
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Full text
(a) The following systems of records are exempt from 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), (d), (e)(1) and (f):
(1) Indian Gaming Individuals Records System.
(2) Management Contract Individuals Record System.
(b) The exemptions under paragraph (a) of this section apply only to the extent that information in these systems is subject to exemption under 5 U.S.C. 552a(k)(2). When compliance would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the overall responsibilities of the Commission, with respect to licensing of key employees and primary management officials for employment in an Indian gaming operation or verifying the suitability of an individual who has a financial interest in, or management responsibility for a management contract, the applicable exemption may be waived by the Commission.
(c) Exemptions from the particular sections are justified for the following reasons:
(1) From 5 U.S.C. 552a(c)(3), because making available the accounting of disclosures to an individual who is the subject of a record could reveal investigative interest. This would permit the individual to take measures to destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area to avoid the investigation.
(2) From 5 U.S.C. 552a(d), (e)(1), and (f) concerning individual access to records, when such access could compromise classified information related to national security, interfere with a pending investigation or internal inquiry, constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, reveal a sensitive investigative technique, or pose a potential threat to the Commission or its employees or to law enforcement personnel. Additionally, access could reveal the identity of a source who provided information under an express promise of confidentiality.
(3) From 5 U.S.C. 552a(d)(2), because to require the Commission to amend information thought to be incorrect, irrelevant, or untimely, because of the nature of the information collected and the length of time it is maintained, would create an impossible administrative and investigative burden by continually forcing the Commission to resolve questions of accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness.
(4) From 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(1) because:
(i) It is not always possible to determine relevance or necessity of specific information in the early stages of an investigation.
(ii) Relevance and necessity are matters of judgment and timing in that what appears relevant and necessary when collected may be deemed unnecessary later. Only after information is assessed can its relevance and necessity be established.
(iii) In any investigation the Commission may receive information concerning violations of law under the jurisdiction of another agency. In the interest of effective law enforcement and under 25 U.S.C. 2716(b), the information could be relevant to an investigation by the Commission.
(iv) In the interviewing of individuals or obtaining evidence in other ways during an investigation, the Commission could obtain information that may or may not appear relevant at any given time; however, the information could be relevant to another investigation by the Commission.
Legislative history
This is a federal regulation, adopted through agency rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act — not enacted by a recorded vote of Congress.