§ 147.4 Guideline B—Foreign influence.

(a) The concern. A security risk may exist when an individual's immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not citizens of the United States or may be subject to duress. These situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure. (b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include: (1) An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country; (2) Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence or duress exists; (3) Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government; (4) Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals; (5) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service; (6) Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government; (7) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure; (8) A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence. (c) Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include: (1) A determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and the United States; (2) Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official United States Government business; (3) Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent; (4) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country; (5) Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual's security responsibilities.